“Al-ANWAR”, Lebanese newspaper,
Beirut  April 8, 1980

The Book “The Army and the State in Lebanon (1945-1980)”
Adel A. FRAYHAH: the 1975 roots are deep-rooted down with deviation
and concerned by the (Arab military) unanimity

“The Army and the State in Lebanon (1945-1980)” is the title of a new book written by Dr. Adel A. Frayha, published in French by the Public Library of Law and Jurisprudence in Paris, constituted of a big volume of 245 pages.

            Dr. Frayha, graduate in Economics from the Saint Joseph University, in Beirut (Lebanon), student of the European Center in Nancy (France) attached to the Common European Market. He presented a paper concerning “The Cohesion of the Attitude of the French Parliamentarians in the French Parliament and European Parliament”. He continued his studies obtaining the Higher Studies Diploma in Political Sciences from the University of Nancy 2. On 20/12/1978, he sustained a thesis titled “The Army and the State in Lebanon” (from 1945 until 1974) in order to obtain the State PhD in Political Sciences. The French eminent professor Georges Burdeau from the University of Paris required him to continue the study i.e. to treat the Lebanese events from 1975 until 1980, studying their reasons and the role of the Lebanese Army through them.

            Dr. Frayhah is a lecturer in the Lebanese University in the subject of political diplomacy and political parties. He is the owner of a specialized private economical and legal Bulletin.

            The book is constituted of two sections: in the first, the writer handles “the most important factors of political life that hindered the achievement of the military coups”. In the second section, he handles “the intervention of the army in the Lebanese political life”.
The writer stresses in the study’s first section on the most important factors that hindered the military coups attempts of which the political regime that he described it as a “Royal Oligarchic” regime, specially a “Royal Political Feodal Regime”. He also mentions the 1943 National Pact from its two sides: the political and the confessional side, considering the confessional side as an essential one; that stood against the coups d’Etat. Then, he mentioned the others affected factors, of which the belonging of General Fuad Chehab to the school of Bechara Khoury and Riad Solh (the constitutional school) and Michel Chiha’s one; the economical progress of Lebanon; the weight of history (the belonging of the Phoenician (Lebanese) Cities (Beryt, Byblos, Tyr, Sidon) to the Democracy and the individualism existing inside the Lebanese people that reflected on the officers’ level.

            Dr. Frayha treated in the second section of the first part the non-serious coups attempts that occurred in Lebanon, the most important of which are: the coups attempts of July 1949, December 1961 and March 1976.

The Army and The Politics

            In the second part of his study, the writer explained the interventions of the army in the state’s political life, separating the intervention of the army in the 1958 crisis as a neutral power from the direct interventions and described the army’s behavior in the 1958 crisis by the moderate attitude that it is the only possible even if it leads to power. Concerning the direct interventions, (it is the second part of the second section), it was of four powers: “a reforming power” of the administration, the social and economical life, especially between 1960 and 1964; a security power (second bureau) (intelligence service) on the political power between 1964 and 1970; a military power represented by the attitude of the military institution towards the Palestinian problem and the Middle East Conflict. According to Frayha the 1958 crisis occurred because of the deviation of Lebanon from the political structure of the National Pact (neutrality of politic of axes) (pro-bagdad Pact) (against Cairo Pact). While the roots of the 1975 crisis are deep-rooted through the military deviation with a cause (Palestinian) that had preoccupied by the military Arab unanimity; the fourth power, a power without power during the all five years war (1975-1980).

The Causes of War

            The writer justifies that the reasons of the war that occurred on the Lebanese territories between 1975 and 1980 are due to the non-existence of a defensive politics that protects the Lebanese territories, the conflict between the refusal front (the refusal to make peace with Israel) and the acceptance Front in order to find a solution to the Palestinian problem in the Lebanese territories. Then he treated the Lebanese army behavior from the side of the paralysis of its real capacity and resorting to it partially. First as a helping force for the interior security Forces; secondly as a separating zone between the zones in conflict; thirdly to impose the order in a certain region (Zahle); fourthly, the Army decomposition with the war continuity (Ahmad Khatib, Aziz Ahdab).

            Dr. Frayha concludes that each State has the Army of its Policy. Nevertheless the Lebanese army is advanced politically on the state of the Lebanon. General Fuad Chehab position in 1952 by refusing to be a president, giving space for the election of Kamil Chamoun as President of the Republic is a perfect attitude as well as the army attitude in 1958 is a good example that a state should follow. The second bureau’s intervention in the political life between 1958 and 1970, even if it were illegal and surpassing its minimum, wasn’t else than letting the state live in the political way of medium.

            Frayha also concludes that sectarianism, federation, confederation, cantons system and civilization multiplicity aren’t else than an illusion in front of the Lebanese policy committed to the unanimous Arab decisions, political and military decisions, and Lebanon shouldn’t belong to a confession other than the State confession.

            And if it’s difficult to separate religious authority from the secular authority in a country where confessional fact is a national tradition and a political framework, the reason of state should be dominant. The more the central political regime weakens, the more Lebanon is decomposed.

Ottoman Empire and Palestinian Cause

The weak reign of Bashir III (1841) witnessed the division of Lebanon into two administrative districts, while during the provincial governorate (Mutassarifia) (1861-1915), the French Mandate (1923-1943) as well as the mandat of General Fuad Chehab (1958-1964) proved that the strong  power limits the sectarian confessionalism in Lebanon, since 1845: (Chekib Effendi Arrangements – Tartibats of the Ottoman Foreigh Affairs Minister). Even if the regional wars and conflicts are one of the main reasons in the decomposition of Lebanon: (collapse of the Ottoman Empire) and (finding a solution to the Palestinian problem 1975-1982). So that Lebanon must to be as liberties country, nevertheless these political liberties must not be absolute.

The writer sees that the State must limit these liberties and in the same time, ensure the balance between the regions, especially Beirut, the Mount Lebanon and the five others Districts.

In this Lebanon, well-balanced Christian-Islamic State, that constitutes the Man’s Home – and not a group of allied confessions that eaten up by each others at the right time – the citizen can to blossom his self completely, protected by a responsible national Army, in a lasting State.

The study of Dr Frayha is the first of his kind. It distinguishes itself  by its objectivity and its deep analyze through the relations between the Army and the State in Lebanon.